



Do Bank Branches Matter Anymore?
O. Emre Ergungor and Stephanie Moulton
Bank branches have been disappearing in some major metropolitan areas, as their populations and economic activ-
ity decline. Our research suggests that brick-and-mortar branches provide tangible beneﬁ  ts to consumers, especially 
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. When branches are located in these areas, borrowers living there default 
less and have greater access to credit.
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The United States has a decades-old tradition of encourag-
ing banks to keep their branches open in low- and moder-
ate-income areas. Under the Community Reinvestment Act, 
banks are not only encouraged to maintain branch presence 
in such locations, but they are also expected to meet the 
credit, investment, and banking services needs of the low- 
and moderate-income areas around those branches.
However, as populations and economic activity decline in 
some areas, banks face a special problem. Even if every 
bank is acting responsibly under the CRA and trying to 
treat communities consistently by maintaining the same 
branch density (number of branches per capita), the number 
of branches will inevitably decline in sync with the decline 
in population and proﬁ  table business opportunities. This 
means that the access to banking services may degrade for 
some members of the community as they have to travel 
greater distances to ﬁ  nd a bank branch.
While this is surely inconvenient, our research suggests 
that greater distance from a bank has implications that go 
beyond mere inconvenience. Unlike cars or groceries, loan 
products are special in that pricing them properly in low- 
and moderate-income areas may require an intimate knowl-
edge of the community and its people. As we explain in this 
Commentary, the lending market in these neighborhoods can 
fail without a lender with local experience; that is, some 
creditworthy people may not be able to get credit even if 
they travel to the next bank branch miles away. Thus, brick-
and-mortar branches provide tangible beneﬁ  ts to consum-
ers, especially in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 
A physical bank presence leads to at least two measurable 
beneﬁ  ts: It makes it possible for creditworthy borrowers 
living there to obtain loans, and it leads to lower rates of 
default among them. 
Increasing distance between consumers and bank branches 
can have real social costs if these beneﬁ  ts are lost. Yet pro-
viding a policy solution to this problem is tricky. Like any 
other business, banks are guided by the proﬁ  t motive, and 
branches move over time from areas where the business is 
shrinking to where it is growing. Because this is a slow-mov-
ing process, it is difﬁ  cult to pin the responsibility for the loss 
of lending services in a low-to-moderate- income area on the 
shutdown of any particular branch in the neighborhood. In 
other words, the straw that broke the camel’s back is prob-
ably not the closing of the last few remaining branches. 
This is not to say that policymakers should coerce banks 
to remain in declining neighborhoods. Such a response 
would be unwise from a safety and soundness perspective 
if the area no longer has the population density to support 
proﬁ  table banking operations. However, if as a society we 
care about the lost opportunities of creditworthy low-income 
individuals, we would beneﬁ  t from identifying ways to over-
come the ﬁ  nancial disincentives banks may face in serving 
these distressed areas.
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Bank Branches in Declining Markets
As an example of recent trends in bank branches, consider 
what’s been happening in four major population centers in 
Ohio. Over the last eight years, Cuyahoga County lost a net 
total of 7 bank branches out of 430, Lucas County lost 5 out 
of 127, and Mahoning County lost 5 out of 84. But not all 
areas were net losers. For example, Franklin County added 
34 to its 310. In all these counties, the average number of 
residents served per branch remained essentially unchanged. 
In other words, branch gains and losses went hand-in-hand 
with population gains and losses. In sync with deep popula-
tion losses, branches that closed in the lowest-income areas, 
tended not to be replaced with a new branch in the same 
neighborhood or any nearby (ﬁ  gure 1). It is worth empha-
sizing that our naming of these counties is for illustration 
purposes and does not mean that these areas are now under-
served, as we do not have any evidence to make such a case.
To get a more accurate view, we plot in ﬁ  gure 2 the number 
of branches at various distances from the county adminis-
trative building, which we assume to be the city center. In 
Franklin County the number of net new branches increased 
at almost all distances from the county seat from 2001 to 
2010. In Cuyahoga, Mahoning, and Lucas Counties, how-
ever, banks tended to close their branches in city centers.
The population trends in ﬁ  gure 3 and other county char-
acteristics in table 1 provide a glimpse into why banks may 
have behaved this way. Unlike Franklin County, Cuyahoga, 
Mahoning, and Lucas Counties have been losing population 
for many decades. A greater percentage of the population 
lives in poverty in those three counties, wages are growing 
more slowly, business establishments are closing, unemploy-
ment is higher, citizens are less educated, and the housing 
stock is much older. All in all, these characteristics suggest 
that Cuyahoga, Mahoning, and Lucas Counties may no lon-
ger be able to provide to banks the business opportunities 
that they used to, which could explain the closing of bank 
branches.
But what are the implications for people who live in areas 
that lost a bank branch? How are they affected by access to 
fewer and more distant branches? These are the questions 
we turn to next.
Why Do Bank Branches Matter?
Economists have long theorized that a bank with a brick-
and-mortar presence can develop valuable know-how about 
the credit risk and business opportunities in its market by 
interacting with consumers and businesses as it delivers loan 
and deposit products. The idea is that a physical presence 
is key because the bank has to interact repeatedly with the 
community to develop the necessary relationships. 
For example, imagine a simple world in which there are 
only two mortgage applicants, both with credit troubles in 
their past. The ﬁ  rst applicant now prioritizes her expenses 
so that she can pay her mortgage ﬁ  rst, the other applicant 




Note: Low-income areas are Census tracts that qualify for the low-income housing 
tax credit (LIHTC).
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she enjoys splurging once in a while, even if that means 
she might miss a mortgage payment or two or perhaps 
even default. Neither applicant can provide a down pay-
ment, and the lender cannot determine which applicant is 
the creditworthy one by looking at the tainted credit scores 
or the limited ﬁ  nancial information they can provide. If it 
could, then the responsible applicant would get a lower-
interest loan reﬂ  ecting her lower risk, and the other would 
get a higher-cost loan or be denied. 
But here is the problem. If the lender charges a low interest 
rate on mortgages to make them affordable to the cred-
itworthy applicant, it will lose money because the other 
applicant will also get the same mortgage and potentially 
default. If the interest rate is high enough so that the lender 
is compensated for the likely credit loss, then the loan be-
comes unaffordable to the creditworthy applicant and only 
the applicant who does not mind missing payments shows 
up at the branch. Thus the lender ﬁ  nds itself in a bind; no 
matter what the interest rate is, it is never proﬁ  table to lend 
in this market; as a result, creditworthy borrowers cannot get 
credit. Economists refer to this problem as adverse selection.
Bank-customer relationships can overcome this obstacle. 
For banks, interactions with customers allow them to gather 
information on a customer, so-called soft information, which 
is not easily captured in a credit score. For example, if the 
prospective loan customer has a checking account with the 
bank, then the bank can glean information from that ac-








Within miles of county building
Cuyahoga County
Number of branches














0-1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17















Within miles of county building











Within miles of county building
0-1 3-4 6-7 9-10 12-13 15-16 18-19 21-22 24-25 27-28
2002
2010
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits.
2011-13.indd   5 8/3/2011   4:03:42 PM Figure 3.  Population Trends
Franklin Cuyahoga Mahoning Lucas
Percent below 
poverty level
15.80 16.40 16.80 17.30




0.90 –2.60 –1.70 –2.10
Percent change in 
average employment 
(2003–2009)
–1.20 –4.30 –3.50 –5.60
Percent change in 
average weekly wage 
(2003–2009)
17.50 17.20 12.70 10.30
Unemployment rate 7.3 7.9 9.4 9.3
Percent with high 
school degree or less
38.50 45.30 54.50 47.80
Median year 
house built
1972 1953 1958 1957
Vacant housing units 
(percent)
11.90 12.70 11.90 11.60
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Census Bureau.
Things like an average account balance, propensity to 
overdraw the account, and the regularity of deposits signal 
information to the bank about the customer. This is the 
kind of information that only the bank with the checking 
account relationship could easily collect. Indeed, a recent 
study has found that banks that have access to this sort of 
usage information from their loan customers’ other accounts 
are able to identify the more creditworthy borrowers. 
Banks operating in a local market are also more likely to 
have information on the local economy, giving them a con-
text from which they can evaluate the future prospects of 
a borrower that is not readily available to an out-of-market 
lender. For instance, a bank with close ties to your market 
may know that your employer is having ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties 
and that it was turned down for a loan. This would make 
you, its employee, a high-risk borrower. Alternatively, you 
may be a temporary worker, but your banker may have 
heard from your employer during a game of golf that the 
business is expanding and will need new employees. This 
means that your temporary position may become perma-
nent. You are in fact a lower-risk borrower than it may seem 
to a distant lender, who evaluates you based on the job title 
written on your paystub. 
Because the gathering of soft information is difﬁ  cult to do 
without a physical presence in a local market, the closing 
of a bank branch is different from the closing of a grocery 
store. One can still buy oranges, perhaps at a higher cost, by 
traveling farther to a different grocery store. But one cannot 
always get a loan by traveling to a distant lender.
This may sound like the George Bailey-style relationship-
based lending that you may have seen in the movie It’s a 
Wonderful Life, rather than the modern banking of the 21st 
century. There is some truth to that belief. Over the last 30 
years, banking has moved away from the intimate relation-
ships described above to a more arm’s-length business 
model based on complex risk estimations (credit scores) and 
other automated underwriting (origination) rules. Those 
new tools have freed banks to lend wherever they want 
without relying on branch presence. Credit bureaus can sup-
ply lenders with information about your past borrowing and 
repayment habits, which are a good indicator of your future 
behavior. They may not be as good of an indicator as really 
getting to know the borrower, but obtaining a credit score 
is so much cheaper than maintaining a branch that the cost 
savings are worth the higher risk.
Both lenders and borrowers have beneﬁ  ted in some ways 
from this shift in business practices. A mortgage that took 
90 days to close in the old days now takes less than a month 
for most borrowers. Lenders can originate loans at a higher 
volume without charging higher interest rates—an upward 
shift in the supply curve, as economists would call it—so 
more credit is available. Research does indeed show that the 
broader adoption of credit scoring among lenders has been as-
sociated with an increase in the overall supply of credit, along 
with an increasing distance between lenders and borrowers.
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like George Bailey in the mortgage markets. Lenders who 
use credit scores and other hard information like paystubs 
and bank statements were thought to have driven out the 
neighborhood banker who knew your father and his father 
before that. As it turns out, while credit scores are great 
tools to separate people with past credit problems from 
those with spotless balance sheets, they are not a perfect 
screening device when it comes to separating people who 
defaulted for good reasons, such as life events, from people 
who defaulted for bad reasons, such as the inability to con-
trol their spending habits. Recent research ﬁ  nds that a physi-
cal branch presence and intimate knowledge of a neighbor-
hood and a borrower can help creditworthy borrowers in 
the pool of applicants with low-credit scores.
Who Beneﬁ  ts Most from Neighborhood Banking? 
The beneﬁ  cial-relationships argument has some interesting 
implications, which can be validated with data. First, the 
main beneﬁ  ciaries among borrowers should be the ones that 
ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to access credit from banks that use the low-
er-cost automated underwriting criteria. These are people 
typically with low incomes, tainted credit histories, and low 
credit scores. Therefore, they would beneﬁ  t from any ad-
ditional piece of information not captured by the score. 
Second, if relationship lenders are better informed about bor-
rowers’ creditworthiness, we should observe fewer instances 
of default among the loans they make. Third, with the 
uncertainties about borrower quality eased and default risk 
reduced, credit should become more abundant and cheaper 
if there are bank branches in low-income area. Our research 
revealed evidence that supports all three implications.
On the default issue, we ﬁ  nd that low-income homebuyers 
who obtain their mortgages from banks with branches in 
their neighborhoods are less likely to default than homebuy-
ers who use banks without a branch in the area or mortgage 
brokers. This effect is especially strong among borrowers 
with low credit scores. While the average default rate for 
this group was around 20 percent, the default rate of those 
borrowers who took their loans from a local bank was up 
to 4.3 percentage points lower. Also as predicted, the price 
of mortgage credit does indeed decline, and its availability 
increases as there are more bank branches closer to low-
moderate income areas—an effect that is too strong to be ex-
plained by increased competition alone. There is no similar 
effect in higher-income areas.
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that a physical presence gives banks 
the opportunity to get to know distressed areas better and 
channel resources to people who can manage them best. 
However, these creditworthy people are also likely to be ﬁ  -
nancially constrained, and so unlikely to be able to bear the 
full cost of keeping a branch open in an area with declining 
business opportunities. Thus, they are the ones who will be 
worse off when branches close. 
Our research shows the beneﬁ  ts that come from creditwor-
thy borrowers in declining low-income areas being in close 
physical proximity to a bank branch. The public policy chal-
lenge is to identify how to get those beneﬁ  ts when private 
markets alone do not provide them.
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